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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE WESTERN SAHEL SUB-REGION – II. RISKS 
AND THREATS BEFORE AND AFTER THE DIRECT IMPACT OF THE ARAB 
REVOLTS AND THE WAR IN LIBYA - III.THE EVOLUTION IN THE AREA – 
IV. CONCLUSIONS.
ABSTRACT: This article addresses the most important security challenges existing in the Western 
Sahel countries, an emerging sub-region encompassing Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and 
Niger. The sub-region is very much affected by developments in neighboring countries such as 
Algeria, Libya, and Nigeria, among others. A number of recent processes – the Arab revolts and 
their effects in Libya and Egypt, the reinforcement of Boko Haram as a regional terrorist threat, etc 
– have contributed to aggravate insecurity in a region that suffers environmental problems, political 
instability, inter-communitarian tensions and illegal traffi cking since a number of decades ago. All 
these risks and threats are inviting states and international organizations to become more and more 
involved in order to provide responses and, eventually, solutions.
KEYWORDS: Al Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Ansar Eddine; Boko 
Haram; CEMOC (Coordination of Major Staffs from Algeria, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania); G-5 
Sahel Organization; illegal traffi cking; MINUSMA (United Nations Mission for the Stabilization 
of Mali); MUJAO (Movement for Unity and Jihad in Western Africa).
RIESGOS Y AMENAZAS EN EL SAHEL OCCIDENTAL. RADICALIZACIÓN Y 
TERRORISMO EN LA SUBREGIÓN
RESUMEN: Este artículo se ocupa de los desafíos de seguridad más importantes que podemos 
inventariar en los países del Sahel Occidental, una subregión emergente que incluye a Burkina Faso, 
Chad, Malí, Mauritania y Níger. La subregión se ve muy afectada por los procesos que se viven en 
países vecinos como Argelia, Libia y Nigeria, entre otros. Algunos procesos recientes – las revueltas 
árabes y sus efectos en Libia y Egipto, el reforzamiento de Boko Haram como amenaza terrorista 
regiona, etc – han contribuido a incrementar la inseguridad en una región que ya sufre desde hace 
décadas problemas medioambientales, inestabilidad política, tensiones intercomunitarias y tráfi cos 
ilícitos. Todos estos riesgos y amenazas invitan a los Estados y a las Organizaciones Internacionales 
a involucrarse cada vez más en el esfuerzo para encontrar respuestas y eventualmente soluciones 
a los mismos.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Al Qaida en las Tierras del Magreb Islámico (AQMI); Ansar Eddine; Boko 
Haram; CEMOC o Coordinación de Estados Mayores de Argelia, Níger, Malí y Mauritania); Misión 
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de las Naciones Unidas para la Estabilización de Malí (MINUSMA); Movimiento para la Unicidad 
del Islam y el Yihad en África Occidental (MUYAO); Organización G-5 del Sahel; tráfi cos ilícitos.
RISQUES ET MÉNACES DANS LE SAHEL OCCIDENTAL. RADICALISATION ET 
TERRORISME DANS LA SUB-REGION
RÉSUMÉ: Cet article s’ ocupe des défi s de sécurité les plus importantes qu’ on trouve dans la 
sub-région du du Sahel Occidentale (le Burkina Faso, le Tchad, le Mali, la Mauritanie et le Nïger). 
Cette sub-région deviens très touchée par les processus vécus en Algérie, en Libye et au Nigéria, 
parmis des autres pays voisins. Quelques evénements tels que les revoltes arabes dans la Libye 
ou en Egypte et aussi le renforcement de Boko Haram en tant que groupe terroriste de dimension 
régionale ont contribué à aggraver l’ insécurité dans la région. En plus, les pays du Sahel Occidentale 
sont affectés depuis des decenies par des problèmes tels que les crises environmentales, l’ instabilité 
politique, les tensions inter-communitaires et les traffi cs illicites. Tels risques et telles ménaces 
invitent les états et les organisations internationales à designer des réponses et, eventuellement, des 
solutions a ceux problèmes.
MOTS CLEFS: Al Qaida dans le Maghreb Islamique (AQMI); Ansar Eddine; Boko Haram; 
CEMOC (Coordination des états-majors de l’ Algérie, le Mali, la Mauritanie et le Niger); Mission 
des Nations unis pour la Stabilisation du Mali (MINUSMA); Mouvement pour l’ Unicité et pour le 
Jihad dans l’ Afrique Occidentale (MUJAO); Organisation du G-5 Sahel; traffi cs illicites.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE WESTERN SAHEL SUB-REGION
In security terms, the Western Sahel is a more than 3 million of  square kilometers 
arid belt south of  the Sahara where Jihadist Salafi st terrorists and traffi ckers, among 
other threats, operate. These have been and remain much more concentrated in the 
Western Sahel, where they represent a threat for the African and Western countries. 
The Western Sahel sub-region is involving the fi ve countries belonging to the G-5 
Sahel Organization which was born in Nouakchott on 18 February 2014.2 The 
building up of  this International Organization is an additional effort in order to 
improve coordination on security and development among the countries of  the 
Western Sahel.
The fi ve countries and a number of  neighbors (mainly Ivory Coast, Libya, 
Algeria or Nigeria, among others) we will deal with later must confront organized 
2 Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Mauritania has the Presidency of  the G-5 Sahel 
Organization this year, and Chad will lead it in 2015. Other sub-regional organizations active in the area 
are the Senegal River Organization (involving Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal), and the 27 states’ Sahel 
and Sahara Community (CEN-SAD). The Economic Community of  West African States (ECOWAS), 
involving 15 states, will be addressed in other chapter of  this article. Finally, the 13 states Committee 
of  States Fighting Against the Drought and Desertifi cation in the Sahel (CILSS, in its French acronym) 
is not a strong organization able to deal with security and defense matters. 
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crime, cross-border terrorism, clandestine immigration, drug traffi cking, political 
corruption, economic problems and environmental crises. The region is also 
concentrating the largest density of  poor people in the world if  we take into account 
the human development list, mainly affecting countries such as Mali or Niger.
Also a number of  these countries – mainly Mali – are politically unstable, 
wracked by ethnic and sectarian violence. Some of  them can be considered failing 
states but they are not failed states in the terms that countries such as Somalia has 
been considered for years.
1. THE IMPORTANCE OF A NUMBER OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES
Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, Burkina Faso, Libya, Algeria or Nigeria are countries 
bordering the Western Sahel. A number of  them can be considered countries in 
crisis. For instance, Mali, a full member of  the Western Sahel, is politically unstable, 
wracked by ethnic and sectarian violence.
Ivory Coast and Libya were for decades two countries of  opportunities for the 
people in the region, providing jobs to hundreds of  thousands of  immigrants until 
a number of  years ago. The war in Ivory Coast in the 2000s and the revolts and the 
civil war in Libya in 2011 transformed negatively the situation of  both countries. 
In Algeria, Libya and Nigeria, a miryad of  terrorist groups are able to carry out 
terrorist operations across the borders in the region.
Libya is today a sanctuary for terrorists, allowing them being active in the Sahel 
to regroup, train and avoid detection in the afterwards of  Operation Serval was 
launched led by France in January 2013.3 The In Amenas attack in January 2013, 
and the two suicide attacks in Niger, in May 2013, were launched from the Libyan 
ground by a group led by an Algerian terrorist, Mokhtar Belmokhtar (aka Mr. 
Marlboro or Belouar). Algeria was very important in the past in terms of  terrorist 
violence, with the Islamic Armed Group and the Salafi st Group for Preaching 
and Combat (GIA and GSPC, in their French acronyms) projecting terrorism 
and radicalization in the Sahel in the last two decades. In addition to the terrorist 
activism, bad relations between Algeria and Morocco has traditionally been and 
already remains an additional negative input for the Sahel region in security terms.
In terms of  drug traffi cking, Guinea Bissau and Nigeria must also be pointed 
out. Guinea Bissau is deteriorating in security terms since the coup d’ etat of  12 
3 “Libyan capital under Islamist control after Tripoli airport seized”, The Guardian, 24 August 2014, 
in <www.theguardian.uk.com>.
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April 2012, and Nigeria is a key country when we deal with the Western Sahel in 
security terms not only because it is the place where the terrorist organization Boko 
Haram was born and is already acting but also due to the fact that drug production 
and drug traffi cking is very much affecting this country.4 Burkina Faso has suffered 
a coup d’ etat at the end of  October 2014, and is also entering in a process of  
domestic deterioration of  security with potential regional consequences.5
2. THE CENTRAL ROLE PLAYED BY NIGERIA IN THE REGION
Nigeria’s population of  170 million, the biggest in Africa, is comprised of  
almost equal numbers of  Christians and Muslims. The Boko Haram Jihadist Salafi st 
offensive, very bloody in the last fi ve years, is overlapped with a mix of  tribal 
and religious animosity aggravated by political corruption, and growing rivalries 
over land and water resources. Boko Haram has gained the capacity to strike in 
increasingly urban centers and beyond national borders, towards Cameroon and 
also the Sahel.
Nigerians suffer real atrocities in the region around Lake Chad, which lies on 
the borders between Niger, Nigeria and Chad. Since the Nigerian Government 
declared a state of  emergency in three states (Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe), in May 
2013, nearly 100,000 people have fl ed to Niger, Camerun and Chad. In addition, 
more 1,5 million people is internally displaced inside Nigeria and more than 20,000 
Nigerian refugees are in Niger. In this context, President Goodluck Jonathan 
appointed a new Defence Minister in March 2014, obligged by these circunstances. 
The massive kidnapping by Boko Haram of  more than 200 girls in the Spring 2014 
has contributed to place the Abuja’s regime at the odds.6
Boko Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, has killed thousands of  Christians and 
also a number Muslim leaders in Nigeria, has threatened directly the US and other 
Western countries and, in a twenty eight minutes video published on 19 February 
2014, has also threatened the Nigerian oil facilities.7 In sum, the year 2014 has been 
4 Nigeria enacted a comprehensive Anti-Terrorism Legislation and a Money Laundering Act, both 
in 2011, and has reinforced its Armed and Security Forces but this country continues to be a disturbing 
element in the region.
5 BERRATO, L., “Burkina Faso: Le gouvernement décrete l’ etat d’ urgence”, El Watan (Algeria), 31 
October 2014, in <www.elwatan.org>.
6 In July 2013 the United Kingdom formally designated Boko Haram as a terrorist organization, 
with the US following in November 2013.
7 OLUGBODE, M., “Nigeria: 25 Towns Under the Control of  Boko Haram”, Allafrica.com, 18 
September 2014, in <http://allafrica.com>.
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and continuous to be entral for Boko Haram’ letal activism in Nigeria and in the 
sub-region.8
Nigerian organized criminal networks also remain a major factor in moving 
cocaine and heroin worldwide being Nigeria a transit country for these drugs 
destined mainly for Europe. Widespread corruption in Nigeria facilitates criminal 
activity and combined with Nigeria’s central location along major traffi cking routes 
enables criminal groups to fl ourish and make this African country an important 
traffi cking hub.
II. RISKS AND THREATS BEFORE AND AFTER THE DIRECT IMPACT
 OF THE ARAB REVOLTS AND THE WAR IN LIBYA
Before the Arab revolts the deterioration of  security in Ivory Coast had provoked 
tens of  thousands of  immigrants from Mali, Niger or Burkina Faso, among other 
countries, came back to the Sahel. Illegal traffi cking and corruption were important 
risks in the region. Al Qaida in the Lands of  the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and 
Boko Haram were becoming trans-border threats with their terrorist attacks and 
the increasing number of  kidnappings, and, fi nally, the Tuareg rebellions in Mali 
or Niger were also a reality in historical terms as well as a non-solved problem for 
these two Western Sahel countries.
Nevertheless none of  these risks, or even all of  them together, was or were a 
strategic threat to Western Africa or to the West. Before 2012, anger in northern 
Mali was stoked by collusion between northern Tuareg leaders and Bamako offi cials 
in illegal activities such as traffi cking and hostage-taking by terrorist groups, mainly 
AQIM, but it had not strategic consequences. The GSPC kidnapping of  32 Western 
tourists, in southern Algeria in 2003, initiated an additional terrorist activity in 
the area to be added to the traditional illegal traffi cking, affecting in that time to 
countries such as Mali, Libya, Niger or Chad. AQIM was born from the GSPC early 
in 2007 as an Al Qaida’ s branch in the region: basically Algerian in leadership and 
membership, AQIM became also transnational operating mainly in Mauritania and 
Mali on a trans-border basis.9
8 “Nigéria: l’ armée rejette le ‘califat islamique’ proclamé par Boko Haram”, Jeune Afrique, 25 August 
2014, in <www.jeuneafrique.com>.
9 See ECHEVERRÍA JESÚS, C., “Escenarios privilegiados de germinación del yihadismo salafi sta en 
la vecindad inmediata de Europa: del Magreb y el Sahel hasta Siria”, in BELLO CRESPO, M. (Coord), 
Yihadismo en el mundo actual, Madrid, Ministry of  Defence-Cuadernos de Seguridad y Defensa nº 62, 
September 2014, pp. 85-108, in <www.ceseden.es>.
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But it was the remobilization of  weapons and fi ghters from Libya since 2011 
the fact that fed the contradictions in northern Mali and transformed the situation 
into a strategic threat for the region and for the Western countries as well.
1. THE DIRECT IMPACT OF THE LIBYAN REVOLTS AND CIVIL WAR IN MALI
The initial Tuareg revolt led by the National Movement for the Liberation 
of  the Azawad (MNLA in its French acronym) elements moved from Libya to 
Mali in January 2012 was kidnapped by Jihadist Salafi st groups, and an enormous 
portion of  the Sahelian country fell into the hands of  a myriad of  terrorist groups 
in the fi rst months of  2012 overhelming the Malian state. It was an unprecedented 
achievement for the terrorists – the emergence of  a nucleic Al Qaida Jihadist 
state – requiring urgent and immediately countermeasures from the International 
Community, mainly from the West. The three mean terrorist actors at that time in 
northern Mali were AQIM, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa 
(MUJAO) and Ansar Eddine.
For the time being the mean causes of  Mali’s 2012 instability have yet to be fully 
addressed by the Malian Government and its international partners, almost three 
years after the crisis started. Six causes must be pointed out:
• Communal divisions refl ected in inter-communitarian tensions and confl icts 
remain. Disaffection in the north is demanding to reassert Governmental authority. 
Hundreds of  thousands of  either displaced or refugee people do remain. Almost 
two years after the Tuareg rebellion was launched the deep-rooted historical 
grievances of  Tuareg people have not been addressed. Mali’ s Army was forced 
to pull troops from the Kidal region in May 2014, after losing a battle following a 
botched attempt to seize the town from the Tuareg separatists.
• The second cause of  instability is a fractured military that is demanding 
reforms in the Malian Armed Forces. The political legitimacy was implemented 
through the presidential and general elections in 2013, but with the Mali’s Armed 
Forces only slowly rebuilt, France has been forced to delay its troop withdrawal.10 
• Persistent concerns remain over what many analysts believe might be as 
inevitable terrorist attacks staged now from southern Libya. AQIM’ s and other 
Jihadist groups’ priority is to block the negotiations between Bamako and the 
10 Operation Serval has been transformed in Operation Berkhane in Summer 2014. See GUEYE, 
Bakari: “France renews Sahel commitment”, Magharebia, 7 August 2014, in <www.magharebia.com>.
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Tuareg leaders together with attacking the French, the UN Mission in the country 
(MINUSMA), the Malian and the Algerian forces and interests.11 Concerning 
the MUJAO and the Belmokhtar’s group “Those Who Sign With Blood”, they 
announced their fusion in Summer 2013 as The Mourabitoun, and remain active 
as well.12
• Among the actors in the region we must also encompass Ansar Eddine, out of  
the negotiation processes held along 2014.13 AQIM is ready even to attack MNLA, 
the Arab Movement of  Azawad and the High Council for the Azawad (MAA and 
HCA in their French acronyms) in order to avoid any arrangement between them 
and the Malian authorities.14 Confusion among Ansar Eddine and a miryad of  
Tuareg groups, movements, clans and tribes adds a diffi culty for a defi nition of  the 
negotiating actors.15
• A systemic corruption in the Malian state that is demanding to strengthen 
urgently the rule of  law.
• To forge a lasting peace, the Malian regime must create economic opportunities 
in the north but the region is too dry for agriculture and lacks the mineral resources 
of  the south. Government is seeking to attract companies to start oil production 
in the northern Taudeni basin, closed to the Algerian border, in the next fi ve to ten 
years, but anything will occur before a lasting peace is restored and the terrorist 
threat is dismantled. In the absence of  alternatives to criminality old networking 
will again take control of  the north.
In this context, to analyse what is the role played by the most affected neighbors 
becomes a necessity.
11 “Mali: UN peacekeepers killed by roadside bomb”, BBC News Africa, 18 September 2014, in 
<www.bbcnews.com>.
12 See “Les Almoravides, le nouveau groupe djihadiste de Belmokhtar et du Mujao”, El Watan 
(Algeria), 23 August 2013, in <www.elwatan.com>.
13 Ansar Eddine remains as the greatest terrorist group in the region, with about 800 members, and 
AQIM has around 700. Ansar Eddine’s leader, Iyad Ag Ghali, supports not only to AQIM but also to 
the MUJAO and Boko Haram. See “Iyad Ag Ghali: une video pour signer la rupture avec Alger”, El 
Watan (Algeria), 8 August 2014, in <www.elwatan.com>.
14 MUJAO killed around 30 Tuareg in Tamkoutat, near Gao, on 6 February 2014.
15 OUAZANI, Ch., « L’ Algérie, diplomate au long cours », Jeune Afrique, 27 October 2014, 4 pages, in 
<www.jeuneafrique.com>.
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2. ALGERIA, NIGER, MAURITANIA, AND SENEGAL 
AS THE MOST AFFECTED NEIGHBORS
The Arab revolts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya fully aggravated the situation in 
the region from the Algerian perception. Algeria tries to play the leadership in the 
Western Sahel, through bilateral contacts, and also through regional instruments 
such as the Coordination of  the Joint Military Staffs (CEMOC, in its French 
acronym) since 2010.16 For instance, Algeria has traditionally played a role of  
mediator in the context of  the Tuareg revolts, and considers the region as a risky 
one concerning Jihadist terrorist activities.17 Algiers is very much concerned by the 
fact that Sahel countries are stepping up their efforts with international partners to 
deal with the security threats confronting them, and tried to avoid in 2012 foreign 
intervention in northern Mali, mainly a Western one led by France.18 According to 
the Algerian perception, the biggest Maghreb country is surrounded by the south 
and the east by weak governments and nebulous borders in a region facing rising 
extremist activity. The Algerian Ministers of  Foreign Affairs, Ramtane Lamamra; 
of  African and Sahel Affairs, Abdelkader Messahel; and of  Religious Affairs and 
Wafks, Bounabdallah Ghlamallah, are particularly active in the region. For instance, 
the Minister Ghlamallah announced on 9 March 2014 the coming opening of  a 
School for Imams in Tamanrasset, to be forming 150 imams per year for Algerian 
and the surrounding countries.19
Algeria is very active vis-à-vis Mali and the Western Sahel in large, not only due 
to historical reasons and the direct neighborhood, but also in order to confront the 
growing Moroccan presence in the area.  The Algerian and Moroccan mutual rivalry 
is being very much refl ected in the Western Sahel, a region where Algiers perceives 
with misperceptions the increasing presence of  Morocco, a non Sahelian state, in 
Mali.20  In 2013, the King Mohamed VI contributed to the Economic Community 
16 The CEMOC is involving the Chiefs of  Staff  of  the Algerian, Malian, Mauritanian and Niger 
Armed Forces in terms of  coordinating efforts, and is not a regional organization as such.
17 President Liamine Zeroual visit to the Sahel countries in 1996 was very much connected with the 
GIA terrorist projection in that time in the region.
18 The traditional Algerian opposition to the interference in the internal affairs of  third states is 
behind the Algiers’ diplomatic effort in order to facilitate dialogue and negotiation among the different 
groups fi ghting each other in Libya. See RAMZI, Walid: “Algeria ready to host Libya dialogue”, Magharebia, 
17 September 2014, in <www.elwatan.com>.
19 “Algérie: hausse de 10% du budget militaire, à 13 milliards de dollars”, Jeune Afrique, 9 September 
2014, <www.jeuneafrique.com>.
20 Morocco is occupying the Western Sahara since Autunm 1975, together with Mauritania until 
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of  West African States (ECOWAS) Summit in Yamoussouko (Ivory Coast) and 
attended the arrival to the Presidency of  President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in 
Bamako. In February 2014 the King visited again Mali and also attended, in Guinea 
Conakry in March, a regional summit with sub-regional  implications.21 Morocco 
is the country where the Community of  States of  the Sahel and the Sahara (CEN-
SAD) annual ministerial meeting was held in November 2013.22 Finally, Morocco 
has also been dealing with the sensitive Tuareg question increasing with that the 
concerns in Algeria.23
Together with these tensions, Algiers and Rabat are also and previously 
confronted due to the confl ict in the Western Sahara, a territory fully connected 
with the Western Sahel. In this context, only 17 African states have recognized the 
RASD, a full member of  the OAU since 1984, and Zambia in 2011 and Burundi 
in 2010 decided to change their positions becoming supporters of  the Moroccan 
approach on an autonomy for the territory within the Kingdom. The Moroccan 
diplomatic and fi nancial deployment in the African continent is very much 
connected with this effort in order to attract as many African countries as possible 
to its position. At the same time, Morocco continues doing an enormous lobby in 
order to transmit the message that the Polisario Front is a part of  the global threat 
emerging from the Western Sahel, with direct connection with the jihadist groups.24
Historically, the Moroccan dynasty helped to export Islam to Africa south of  
the Sahara and still maintains infl uence in a number of  “Zawiya” (Islamic religious 
bodies) such as the Tijani in Mali and other Sufi  groups. The increasing visibility 
of  Mohamed VI in West Africa and the Sahel is a big concern for Algeria. At the 
multilateral level, Morocco is providing ground for the CEN-SAD sub-regional 
organization. Also in Maghreb regional terms, Algiers has enhanced its infl uence 
1979  and as the unique occupant since them. The Organization for African Unity (OAU) recognized 
the Arab Saharwi Democratic Republic (RASD, in its French acronym)  in 1984, and Morocco is absent 
from the continental African Organization (OAU/AU, African Union) since then.
21 Guinea Conakry is a country where the Muslim Zawiyas are very much infl uenced by Moroccan 
religious actors.
22 “Maroc: démantelement d’ une cellule terroriste liée aux radicaux islamiques”, El Watan (Algeria), 
13 September 2014, in <www.elwatan.com>.
23 In January 2014 Mohamed VI met the MNLA Secretary-General Bilal Ag Achérif, in Rabat. In 
parallel, Algeria is trying to keep its role with a number of  armed groups in northern Mali.
24 See The Truth about the Polisario. Security in the Sahara and Sahel. The growing threat posed by the Polisario 
run camps near Tindouf, Government of  Morocco, The Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP), 
13 October 2014, 12 pages, in <www.moroccoonthemove.com>.
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over neighboring Tunisia under the guise of  increased security cooperation.
Coming back to Algeria, the country continues suffering in 2014 the AQIM 
terrorist activism. At the same time, AQIM leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel,  has 
refused to recognize the Islamic State (IS), preferring to renew his allegiance to Al 
Qaida. On 13 September 2014 an unknown Algerian terrorist group, Soldiers of  
the Caliphate in Algeria (Djound Al-Khilafa en Algérie), announced its split from 
AQIM and pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi’ s group, the IS.25
Northern Niger, with its central point in Agadez, is one of  the key routes 
between southern Libya and northern Mali, an often-used route for terrorists and 
traffi ckers, the latter traffi cking mainly human beings, weapons and drugs. For 
years, Niger has been locked into its own contentious negotiations with Paris over 
the future of  uranium mining in northern Niger.26 In addition, Niamey is trying to 
leverage its concerns over instability in Libya to gain concessions from its former 
colonizer.27
In security terms, Niger has led in 2014 the Flintlock military exercise annually 
sponsored by the US, and the Government successfully lobbied Washington to 
place a drone surveillance facility in Niamey as is likely seeking greater cooperation, 
training and military aid from France. Niger suffered a double suicide terrorist 
attack in May 2013, with terrorists coming from southern Libya, and is very much 
concerned by the regional situation due to the fact it also has a complex relation 
with its own Tuareg community. Massoudou Hassoumi, Interior Minister of  Niger, 
demanded a French foreign intervention in southern Libya – a region he defi ned as 
an “incubator for terrorist groups” - on 5 February 2014. On 10 October 2014, in 
northern Niger, French forces destroyed an AQIM convoy transporting weapons 
from Libya to Mali.
The Libyan jihadist group Ansar Al Sharía is based in Benghazi but also has 
branches in Ajdabiya, Derna and Sirte. On 29 April 2014 the Libyan Government 
labelled Ansar Al Sharía as a terrorist organization for the fi rst time. Algerian 
25 See FETHI, N., “ISIS offshoot raises questions in Algeria”, Magharebia, 17 September 2014, in 
<www.magharebia.com>.
26 Since the expiration of  its contract on 31 December 2013, the French company AREVA and the 
Niamey Government started negotiations to renew the contract, albeit on more favorable terms for 
Niger. Niger is the world’s fourth largest producer of  uranium after Khazajstan, Canada and Australia. 
However, uranium has not added wealth to Niger, one of  the poorest countries with more than 60% 
of  its 17 million people surviving on less than 1US$ a day.
27 CHERFAOUI, Z., “Les Français dissent non à Niamey”, El Watan (Algeria), 12 February 2014, in 
<www.elwatan.com>.
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jihadists’ presence in Libya has improved the sophistication of  Jihadist actions. For 
instance, Algerian media confi rmed on 17 May 2014 that two Algerians were killed 
and another was injured while fi ghting alongside Ansar Al Sharía in Benghazi. In 
Libya, the terrorists of  Ansar Al Sharía have reiterated that security and stability in 
the country are dependent on the establishment of  Sharia (Islamic Law) and not 
democracy, calling on “every Muslim to unite against infi dels and traitors”. Among 
the latter they situate the retired Libyan army offi cer General Khalifa Haftar who 
began military operations on 16 May 2014 against Islamist militias in Benghazi. 
General Haftar’s operation, together with the proclamation of  the Islamic Caliphate 
in northern Iraq in June 2014, have served as a further catalyst for Islamist militias in 
Libya to increase their cooperation. While increasing co-operation between Libyan 
jihadists has allowed those militants to co-ordinate and to extend co-operation with 
jihadists elsewhere in the region.28 Close relations between Ansar Al Sharía in Libya 
and Mokhtar Belmokhtar has been evoked recently by a number of  analysts in the 
region, as an example of  how Libya is being transformed into a theatre for the 
battle for ascendency between a number of  Al Qaida regional wings and global 
Jihadist groups such as the IS.29
Mauritania is playing a pivotal role in confronting terrorism and other risks and 
threats such as illegal traffi cking in large. The Mauritanian Government considers 
one third of  the total production of  cannabis in Morocco transit by the Sahel 
through Mauritania, the Western Sahara and Algeria, northern Mali and Niger, and 
Latin American cocaine also transits by the Sahel strip.
AQIM has stated on a number of  occasions that it views Mauritania as a legitimate 
target and has previously demonstrated a capability to carry out kidnappings and 
attacks using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). For instance, 
three VBIEDs were intercepted on 1 February 2011 while travelling from Mali 
towards the French Embassy and government targets in Nouakchott, and three 
Spanish aid workers were kidnapped in November 2009 on the highway between 
Nouakchott and Nouadhibou.
The main Islamist party in Mauritania is Tawasoul, a Mauritanian affi liate of  the 
international Muslim Brotherhood organization licensed as a political party in 2007. 
28 See “Militia- Libya tackles Islamist militant groups”, Janes’s Islamic Affairs Analyst (Section: Africa. 
Country: Libya), 28 May 2014. 
29 OUMAR, J., “Jihadist forces vie for infl uence”, Magharebia, 19 September 2014, in <www.
magharebia.com>.
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Tawasoul’ s spiritual leader, Sheikh Mohamed Hasan Ould Dedew, who leads the 
charitable and cultural organization Moustakbel (Future) has traditionally presented 
himself  as a champion of  Muslim causes abroad while avoiding to appear to give 
support to domestic extremism at home. Concerning Jihadist projection, Mauritania 
has created a TV Channel providing moderate Islamic propaganda, the Mahdhara 
Fadharia, on 1 March 2014.30
Finally, Senegal, who shares 800 kilometers of  borders with Mauritania and 
Mali, is also very much concerned by radicalization and by illegal traffi cking.
III. THE EVOLUTION IN THE AREA
Sahel countries are stepping up their efforts with international partners to deal 
with the security threats confronting them.
The region needs to be secured by the support of  foreign forces and other 
foreign instruments but there is no a permanent military solution for the threats 
these countries face. In the long run, economic development, good governance 
and sweeping counter-radicalization strategies are necessary to drain the swamps in 
which Jihadists festers.
National efforts remain central in security terms in the area, with Algeria 
as the central country.31 In terms of  the most recent examples of  operations, 
Algerian security forces arrested 20 alleged criminals attempting to cross the 
border with Niger on 6 October 2014.32 The Algerian&Moroccan competition 
in the area not only remains but it will increase in the next coming months and 
years. Unfortunately, this competition between the two Maghreb powers in the 
Western Sahel will increase the presence of  religion and religious actors in the area, 
a potential additional problem for the future.33
Also situated at the sub-regional dimension, the role played by the ECOWAS, an 
30 See “Foregone conclusion- Incumbent favourite for Mauritanian presidential election”, Jane’s 
Islamic Affairs Analyst (Section: Africa. Country: Mauritania), 13 June 2014.
31 See on the re-organization of  the military deployment in the 4th (Ouargla) and the 6th (Tamanrasset) 
Military Regions in Algeria “Ministère de la Défense Nationale (MDN): Quatre nouveaux secteurs 
militaries pour le grand sud”, El Watan (Algeria), 24 June 2014, in <www.elwatan.com>.
32 On this arrest see RAMZI, W.: “Algeria tightens Niger border security”, Magharebia, 8 October 2014. 
On previous interventions of  heavy weapons in the deep south borders see “Dix terrorists eliminés à 
Tinzaouatine (Tamanrasset). La menace persiste aux frontieres sud”, El Watan (Algeria), 7 May 2014, 
and “L’ armée algérienne saisit des armes de guerre près des frontières avec le Mali”, El Watan, 9 April 
2014.
33 See “Foregone conclusion” op. cit.
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organization involving 15 states, must be evoked. ECOWAS is the most important 
actor in terms of  international subregional organization. In Mali, for instance, the 
ECOWAS imposed the Burkina’s President Blaise Compaoré negotiation with a 
number of  Tuareg groups since the year 2013. A new of  these negotiations between 
Bamako and Tuareg and MINUSMA elements initiated in 2014 was led by Algerian 
diplomats and was not involving the Burkinabe Mediator any more.
Mali and other countries in the region need to be secured not only by African 
forces but also by broader international actors. Mauritanian President Mohamed 
Ould Abdel Aziz is already the President of  the AU, and he has tried to involve the 
continental organization in the efforts to restore peace and stability in the Western 
Sahel. In fact, neither the ECOWAS nor the AU have been able to play a rapid, 
active and effective role in the years 2012 and 2013, and then the UN was invited 
to pay attention to the confl ict in the area through the Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).34  The MINUSMA is authorized to 
involve 12,640 troops and police, and waiting to arrive to its full capacity the 
US, French and European (the European Union Training Mission EUTM-Mali) 
militaries are training African forces contributing to MINUSMA.35
Since July 2013 up to 31 MINUSMA members have been killed by Jihadist 
terrorists.36 Ten Chadian members of  MINUSMA were killed in September 2014 
and nine, all of  them from Niger, were killed on 3 October 2014 between the towns 
of  Menaka and Ansongo, in the Gao region.37 An additional MINUSMA soldier, 
from Senegal, was killed on 7 October 2014 in Kidal.38 On 9 October 2014 Malian 
Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop urged the UN Security Council to send a rapid 
intervention force to fi ght terrorists in the north of  his country.39
34 “Mali confl ict: UN urges to send more troops”, BBC News, 10 October 2014, in <www.bbc.
co.uk>.
35 SCHMITT, E., “US Trains Africa Commandos To Fight Terrorism”, The New York Times, 26 May 
2014.
36 “Mali. L’ ONU condamne l’ attentat qui a coûté la vie à quattre Casques bleus”, El Watan (Algeria), 
13 June 2014, in <www.elwatan.com>.
37 “Nine UN peacekeepers from Niger killed in ambush by rebels in Mali”, The Guardian, 3 October 
2014, in <www.theguardian.com>.
38 “Mali. Durcissement du dispositif  anti-terroriste au Mali, un Sénégalais tué à Kidal”, Jeune Afrique, 
8 October 2014, in <www.jeuneafrique.com>.
39 BALDÉ, A., “Crise au nord-Mali: Bamako appelle au secours”, Afrik.com, 9 October 2014, in 
<www.afrik.com>.
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Niger is contributing with 600 military to MINUSMA since 2013. The recently 
inaugurated French military facility of  Madama, north-east of  Niger and 200 
kilometers from the Libyan border, is a partial and late contribution to the security 
of  the area. In this north-east portion of  the country French forces destroyed an 
AQIM convoy transporting weapons from Libya to Mali on 10 October 2014.
Concerning again the West we must point out the role played by a number 
of  European countries and the EU, on one side, and that of  the US on the other 
side. Among the EU member countries the role played by France has been and 
remains central. Concerning the EU, its Regional Strategy for the Sahel was approved 
in March 2011, and since the year 2013 an Europe the EUTM-Mali is in charge of  
the training of  Malian military.40
Concerning the US, in 2013 the US Special Operations Command begun a 
program to instruct and equip hundreds of  handpicked commandos, in Libya, 
Niger, Mauritania and Mali.41 At the diplomatic level, the Summit on African 
Security, held in Washington DC in August 2014 under the Presidency of  Barack 
H. Obama, provided the political and doctrinal background to the USA approach 
to security in the area.42
Going to the south and involving Nigeria in our study, the terrorist activism of  
Boko Haram must be pointed out. This jihadist group remains very active in the 
last fi ve years but it does exist since the year 2002. In July 2013 the UK formally 
designated Boko Haram a terrorist organization, with the US following suit in 
November 2013. Boko Haram is overlapped as a terrorist actor with a mix of  tribal 
and religious animosity aggravated by political corruption, and growing rivalries 
over land and water resources focused mainly in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram 
has gained the capacity to strike increasingly in urban centers and beyond national 
borders, towards Cameroon and also to the Sahel.
Boko Haram has become a global threat, an enormous Jihadist Salafi st threat, 
larger in scope than the international community may presume. The export of  both 
Boko Haram’s actions and its operatives is increasing concern not only in Cameroon 
but also in the Sahel. Boko Haram captured Gwoza in Summer 2014 and declared 
40 Concerning NATO, a number of  allies have begun plans to train some 20,000 Libyan military in 
Europe through 2014, but the Alliance as such is not implicated either in Mali or in other Western Sahel 
countries. Mauritania is a member of  the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative since the 1990s.
41 See SCHMITT, E., op. cit.
42 “Alger appelle au renforcement du partenariat sécuritaire afro-américain”, El Watan (Algeria), 8 
August 2014, in <www.elwatan.com>.
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its “Caliphate” there. They captured armoured personnel carriers and even tanks 
in this town and continued its offensive in north-east Nigeria. Boko Haram has 
carried out incursions into Niger, Cameroon and even Chad, and in Autumn 2014 
the Nigerian Army was preventing the terrorist group from capturing cities such as 
Maiduguri and Konduga, but the effort against this threat becomes more and more 
urgent and must be multinational in scope.
Nigeria and its neighbors Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger have recently 
decided, in Niamey on 8 October 2014, to deploy since November this year a 
700 military joint force to combat this terrorist group. The Niamey meeting was 
a follow-up of  a May 2014 Summit in Paris, where the leaders who attended 
promised to improve cooperation in the fi ght against Boko Haram after the 
terrorist group kidnapped more than 200 school girls in Chibok, north-east of  
Nigeria.43 Unfortunately, the region and even the international community did not 
defi ne an approach to a common reaction against Boko Haram until that massive 
kidnapping arrived.
Early in October 2014, the release of  27 hostages captured by Boko Haram 
meant that the group had received money and that a number of  Jihadist prisoners in 
prisons of  Cameroon had likely been liberated. That group of  27 hostages included 
10 Chinese construction workers and the wife of  a Vice-Prime Minister of  Nigeria, 
among others.44 Boko Haram does continue with its atrocities even if  a negotiation 
effort, developed in Chad and in Saudi Arabia, for obtaining a cease fi re and the 
release of  many of  the school girls kidnapped in Chibok, created expectation at the 
end of  October.45 In fact, the bloody offensive of  Boko Haram does continue.46
Finally, a non-regional issue must be pointed out in terms of  potential additional 
instability in the region.  Returning jihadist already combating in battlefi elds such 
as Syria and Iraq can feed additional radicalization and terrorism activity in our 
region encompassing the Western Sahel, the Maghreb and Nigeria, and even in 
43 “Regional leaders step up Boko Haram fi ght with troops, command centre”, Reuters, 8 October 
2014, in <http://af.reuters.com>.
44 “Nigerians doubful of  girls’ release after Boko Haram “truce” breached”, Reuters, 19 October 
2014, in <http://af.reuters.com>, and JOHNSTON, Ch., “Fears grow that Nigeria ceasefi re won’t secure 
girls’s release amid fresh attacks”, The Guardian, 18 October 2014, in <www.theguardian.co.uk>.
45 ELORRIAGA, G., “Boko Haram saquea una gran ciudad y desata el pánico en Nigeria”, Diario de 
Navarra, 31 October 2014, p. 9.
46 “Nigeria: la trêve avec Boko Haram rompue par un nouvel enlèvement et la reprise des combats”, 
Jeune Afrique, 27 October 2014, in <www.jeuneafrique.com>.
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Europe.47 Previous generations of  combatants in Afghanistan proved that Jihadist 
activists possessed leadership capabilities, organizational skills, high fi ghting spirit 
and strong momentum, playing very serious roles in the reinforcement of  terrorist 
groups such as the Algerian GIA and the Libyan Islamic Combatant Group (GICL, 
in its French acronym). A new generation of  terrorists who have gained combat 
experience, even as suicide bombers, have been trained and continuous being 
trained in Syria and Iraq.48
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In addition to the traditional risks and threats affecting the countries in the 
Western Sahel area, the Arab revolts which were initiated in the Maghreb in Autumn 
2010, have transformed and enlarged negatively the region in security terms, also 
affecting neighboring areas such as the Western Sahel, and mainly Mali.
In addition, traditional rivalry between Algeria and Morocco in the Maghreb 
was and remain an additional negative input for the Western Sahel sub-region in 
security terms.
The Operation Serval, transformed into Operation Berkhane since 1 August 
2014, has been an achievement in terms of  avoiding the Jihadist total conquest 
of  the Malian state. Nevertheless, the terrorist threat has not been defeated, and 
AQMI, the MUJAO and Ansar Eddine, the three mean terrorist actors since 2012, 
remain active in the area.49
Northern Mali is suffering a sharp increase in strikes on foreign forces, 
particularly on MINUSMA. The spike in attacks against the MINUSMA members 
comes as France has redeployed some of  its forces away from Mali since August 
2014. This reduction of  the French troops and the absence of  the Malian Army 
from northern Mali are contributing to the upsurge of  terrorist activism.
From the south, Boko Haram is emerging as a global problem, an enormous 
Jihadist Salafi st threat, larger in scope than the international community may 
presume. The export of  both Boko Haram’s mission and its operatives is an 
47 A former ISIS member killed four people in Brussels in May 2014. See Musée juif  de Bruxelles. 
Un suspect arrêté  à Marseille”, El Watan (Algeria), 1 June 2014, in <www.elwatan.com>.
48 LAHCEN, M., “Caliphate bell tolls for the Maghreb”, Maghrebia, 11 July 2014, in <www.magharebia.
com>.
49 OUMAR, J., “MUJAO member claims Mali peacekeeper attack”, Magharebia, 7 October 2014, in 
<www.magharebia.com>.
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increasing concern not only in Cameroon but also in the Western Sahel and 
neighboring countries such as the Central African Republic and Chad. The group is 
gaining infl uence in the region and will continue killing and kidnapping in order to 
reinforce its Jihadist enterprise. Boko Haram, together with the IS acting in Iraq and 
Syria, have both money, weapons and logistic equipment, and many fi ghters, and 
are gaining dangerously ground in their respective scenarios of  activity increasing 
the global Jihadist threat.
Western Europe and Western interests in broad that are present in the Western 
Sahel and the Maghreb can suffer the extension of  this Jihadist growing violence. 
Direct attacks against foreign forces deployed in Mali and the practice of  kidnapping 
Western citizens in the Maghreb and the Sahel remain central in terms of  threat. 
Additional terrorists to add to those already acting in the Maghreb, the Sahel or 
northern Nigeria could be the returning jihadists coming back from Syria and Iraq 
skilled in multiple systems of  weapons and explosives. 
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